

Message Text

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PAGE 01 VIENNA 02003 01 OF 02 062230Z

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1872

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 VIENNA 2003

LIMDIS

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: MBFR STATUS OF NEGOTIATIONS

THE FOLLOWING ASSESSMENT OF STATUS OF VIENNA MBFR
NEGOTIATIONS AND OF DECISIONS ON ALLIED POSITION
WHICH ARE NEEDED FROM WASHINGTON MAY BE USEFUL TO
OFFICIALS PARTICIPATING IN PLANNED SENIOR LEVEL
REVIEW OF MBFR STATUS.

1. SINCE THE MBFR TALKS RESUMED IN JANUARY, THERE
HAVE BEEN SEVERAL NEW EASTERN LEADS BUT AS YET NO
MOVEMENT OF SUBSTANCE TOWARDS OUR PRIORITY TACTICAL
OBJECTIVES: TO BRING THE SOVIETS TO AGREE TO ACCEPT
DEFERRAL OF WESTERN EUROPEAN (INCLUDING BUNDESWEHR)
REDUCTIONS TO A SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS, AND

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SECRET

PAGE 02 VIENNA 02003 01 OF 02 062230Z

TO MOVE INTO SERIOUS DISCUSSION OF THE CONTENT OF
THE WESTERN PHASE I PROGRAM.

2. HOWEVER, THE DELEGATION CONTINUES TO BELIEVE THIS IS THE POINT WHERE A BREAKTHROUGH COULD EVENTUALLY BE MADE, AND THAT IT SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE OUR PRIORITY. IF WE ACHIEVE IT, IT WILL MEAN THE SOVIET INTEREST IN EUROPEAN REDUCTIONS WOULD HAVE BEEN CHANNELLED INTO DISCUSSION OF THOSE PROVISIONS IN A PHASE I AGREEMENT PROVIDING FOR A PHASE II, WHERE IT CAN CONTINUE TO BE USED TO SECURE ACCEPTANCE OF THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT.

3. SINCE THE RESUMPTION OF THE TALKS IN MID-JANUARY, THE ALLIES HAVE MAINTAINED A HIGH DEGREE OF COHESION. THEY HAVE SUCCESSFULLY HELD THE MAIN FOCUS OF DISCUSSION ON THE ALLIED, RATHER THAN THE EASTERN APPROACH. SINCE RESUMPTION OF THE TALKS, SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES HAVE CONTINUED TO EXPRESS CONSIDERABLE INTEREST IN MAINTAINING THE 1974-77 CALENDAR PUBLICLY SET FORTH BY BREZHNEV, WHICH MAY BE AN ASSET FOR US. SO FAR AS APPEARANCES CAN BE TRUSTED, BOTH SOVIETS AND EASTERN EUROPEANS CONTINUE TO SEEM INTERESTED IN A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

4. AFTER LONG DIFFICULTIES INVOLVING THE RELUCTANCE OF ANY PARTICIPANT TO BE EXCLUDED FROM THE ACTION, DELEGATION RECENTLY SUCCEEDED IN ESTABLISHING A SMALL EMISSARY FORUM COMPRISING US AND THE SOVIETS AND REPRESENTATIVES OF TWO OTHER DELEGATIONS ON EACH SIDE TO ENABLE INFORMAL, SYSTEMATIC DISCUSSION OF THE SUBJECT MATTER FOR WHICH PLENARIES ARE UNSUITED. IT IS ALREADY CLEAR FROM THE FIRST TWO SUBSTANTIVE SESSIONS THAT THESE INFORMAL SESSIONS, WHICH ARE WITHOUT COMMITMENT ON EITHER SIDE, WILL ENABLE US TO PURSUE OUR PRIORITY OBJECTIVES MORE EFFECTIVELY. WHILE DOING SO, THEY WILL ALSO ENABLE US TO CARRY OUT BY THE TIME OF THE RECESS PLANNED FOR APRIL 12 A MORE DETAILED EXPLORATION OF THE EASTERN REACTION TO ALL ASPECTS OF THE WESTERN PHASE I

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PAGE 03 VIENNA 02003 01 OF 02 062230Z

PROGRAM THAN HAS BEEN POSSIBLE HERETOFORE.

5. THE NEW EASTERN LEADS SINCE THE RESUMPTION OF TALKS IN MID-JANUARY REFERRED TO IN PARA ONE ARE:

(A) EASTERN REFERENCES TO A TROOP FREEZE BETWEEN TWO PHASES OF NEGOTIATIONS (SEE VIENNA 1038, 1039 AND 1932);

(B) INTENSIFIED SOVIET REFERENCES TO "TOKEN"

PARTICIPATION BY WESTERN EUROPEANS IN THE FIRST
PHASE OF A TWO OR THREE-PHASE PROGRAM (SEE VIENNA 1008,
1614 AND 1932);

(C) AN INFORMAL SOVIET HINT THAT IT MIGHT
BE POSSIBLE TO CONCEIVE OF A FIRST STAGE OF
NEGOTIATION INVOLVING ONLY FORCES FROM OUTSIDE THE
AREA (VIENNA 1932).

IT IS NOT CLEAR WHETHER THESE LEADS INDICATE
REAL EASTERN READINESS TO MOVE TOWARD OUR
OBJECTIVES, BUT THEY ARE NOT WITHOUT POSSIBILITY
OF DEVELOPMENT.

6. TO ADVANCE OUR TACTICAL OBJECTIVES, WE PLAN
TO TELL THE SOVIETS BILATERALLY IN THE NEAR
FUTURE, IN A FLAT WAY, THAT THEY SHOULD CLEARLY
REALIZE THAT THE ONLY ROAD TO WESTERN EUROPEAN
REDUCTIONS IS VIA ACCEPTANCE OF A FIRST PHASE
LIMITED TO US-SOVIET REDUCTIONS AND INCLUDING
AGREEMENT ON THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT, AND
THAT, IF THEY ARE INTERESTED IN BEGINNING
REDUCTIONS IN 1975, US-SOVIET REDUCTIONS PROVIDE
THE ONLY FEASIBLE APPROACH.

7. THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN SILENT IN PLENARY
SESSIONS AS REGARDS THE COMMON CEILING SINCE
RESUMPTION OF THE TALKS IN MID-JANUARY. INTEREST-
INGLY, THEY HAVE NOT CRITICIZED THE CONCEPT IN
PLENARY SESSIONS ALTHOUGH THEY HAVE CRITICIZED
ALMOST EVERY OTHER ASPECT OF THE WESTERN APPROACH.

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PAGE 04 VIENNA 02003 01 OF 02 062230Z

IN INFORMAL TALKS (VIENNA 1038 AND 1932), EASTERN REPS HAVE

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SECRET

PAGE 01 VIENNA 02003 02 OF 02 062253Z

61

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 EUR-10 PM-03 CIAE-00 INR-10

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 VIENNA 2003

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INDICATED THAT THE MAIN DEFECT OF THE WESTERN PROPOSAL FOR A COMMON CEILING IS THAT IT IS LIMITED TO GROUND FORCES. IN ORDER TO INDUCE THE SOVIETS TO INDICATE SOME INTEREST IN THE COMMON CEILING THE ALLIES PLAN, AS WASHINGTON SUGGESTED EARLIER, TO TELL THE SOVIETS IN AN INFORMAL SESSION THIS WEEK THAT, WITH REGARD TO EASTERN QUESTIONS ABOUT ASSURANCES CONCERNING WESTERN EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION IN PHASE II, THE ALLIES ARE NOT PREPARED TO MAKE FURTHER COMMITMENTS BEYOND WHAT THEY HAVE ALREADY TOLD THE EAST REGARDING WESTERN EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION IN PHASE II REDUCTIONS IN THE ABSENCE OF EQUIVALENT EASTERN COMMITMENTS TO THE COMMON CEILING AS THE OUTCOME OF PHASE II.

8. IT IS POSSIBLE THE SOVIETS MAY AT SOME POINT RESPOND POSITIVELY TO THIS ALLIED HINT AND INDICATE SOME INTEREST IN THE COMMON CEILING IF THE ALLIES ARE READY TO BECOME MORE EXPLICIT AS REGARDS WESTERN EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION IN PHASE II. WE WOULD AT
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PAGE 02 VIENNA 02003 02 OF 02 062253Z

SUCH A POINT HOPE TO BRING THE ALLIES ALONG TO AN INTERIM FORMULA EXPRESSING WILLINGNESS TO PARTICIPATE IN PHASE II LIKE THAT MENTIONED IN PARA EIGHT OF VIENNA 1509. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF WASHINGTON AGENCIES COULD GIVE ADVANCE STUDY TO THIS POSSIBILITY TO PERMIT RAPID DECISION IF NEEDED.

9. ANOTHER PROBLEM WITH REGARD TO PARTICIPATION IN PHASE II EMERGED DURING THE FEBRUARY 27 INFORMAL SESSION WITH THE SOVIETS WITH WHICH WE HAD HOPED

TO DEAL CONSIDERABLY LATER: THE ISSUE OF US AND SOVIET PARTICIPATION IN PHASE II. WE WANT SOVIET PARTICIPATION IN PHASE II, BUT BELIEVE THE SOVIETS WILL BE RELUCTANT TO PLACE THEMSELVES IN A POSITION WHERE THEY MAY BE EXPOSED TO WESTERN PRESSURES FOR ANOTHER SIZEABLE SOVIET WITHDRAWAL. THIS POSSIBILITY WOULD ALSO AFFECT SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO ENTER PHASE I.

10. FOR THE EVENT THE SOVIETS PRESS THIS ISSUE FURTHER, DELEGATION REQUESTS AUTHORITY TO TELL THE SOVIETS THAT US IS NOT OPPOSED IN PRINCIPLE TO PARTICIPATION IN PHASE II BUT HAS NOT MADE UP ITS MIND ON THE ISSUE AND THAT FURTHER DISCUSSION OF THIS POINT SHOULD BE POSTPONED. IF USED, THIS FORMULATION MIGHT HOLD FOR A TIME, BUT THE ISSUE OF SOVIET AND OF US PARTICIPATION IN PHASE II HAS NOW ARISEN AND SHOULD RECEIVE CONSIDERATION IN WASHINGTON.

11. IF WESTERN PRESSURES FOR SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF THE COMMON CEILING HAVE SOME POSITIVE EFFECT, THEY MAY ALSO BRING RENEWED REQUEST BY THE EAST FOR INCLUSION OF AIR FORCE MANPOWER. IN PREPARATION FOR THIS CONTINGENCY, WE NEED AUTHORITY SOON FROM NATO, WHERE THE ISSUE IS NOW BOGGED DOWN, TO REVEAL OUR NEW AIR FORCE MANPOWER DATA TO THE EAST IN SUPPORT OF THE ARGUMENT THAT, BECAUSE AIR FORCE MANPOWER TOTALS ON EACH SIDE ARE ROUGHLY EQUAL, IT IS ALL THE MORE NECESSARY TO ELIMINATE THE DISPARITY IN GROUND FORCES THROUGH AGREEING TO
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PAGE 03 VIENNA 02003 02 OF 02 062253Z

THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT.

12. EVEN IF POINT ABOVE HAS BEEN MADE, SOVIETS MAY NONETHELESS INSIST ON INCLUDING AIR FORCE MANPOWER IF THEY MOVE TOWARDS ACCEPTANCE OF THE COMMON CEILING. WE THINK IT WOULD BE ADVANTAGEOUS UNDER SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES TO INCLUDE AIR FORCE MANPOWER, ALTHOUGH FOCUSING ACTUAL WITHDRAWALS ON SOVIET GROUND MANPOWER, IF AGREEMENT TO A COMMON CEILING CAN THEREBY BE OBTAINED. SINCE WE WILL ATTEMPT TO GET INTO MORE DETAILED DISCUSSION OF THE COMMON CEILING WITH THE EAST WITHIN NEXT WEEKS, THIS ISSUE MAY BECOME TOPICAL. FOR THAT REASON, IT IS HOPED THAT WASHINGTON AGENCIES CAN BRING THEIR STUDIES ON THIS ISSUE TO A DEFINITE OUTCOME.

13. TO KEEP UP WITH THE INCREASED TEMPO OF EXCHANGES WITH THE EAST, WE WILL ALSO NEED SOON WASHINGTON

DECISIONS ON (A) HOW MANY US FORCES CAN BE WITHDRAWN BY UNITS, (B) ON WHETHER, IN ADDITION TO MANPOWER, THERE SHOULD BE CEILINGS ON WEAPONS, I.E. TANKS OR NUCLEARS, AND (C) ON THE DURATION OF THE FIXED PERIOD OF TIME BETWEEN PHASES.

14. THERE HAVE BEEN INFORMAL EASTERN SUGGESTIONS FOR A FREEZE ON THE FORCES OF DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OTHER THAN US AND SOVIETS IF THE TWO-PHASED NEGOTIATION APPROACH WERE ACCEPTED. SINCE THERE ARE INDICATIONS THE EAST MAY PURSUE MORE ACTIVELY THE IDEA OF A FORCE FREEZE, WE WILL NEED A WASHINGTON DECISION ON THE ACCEPTABILITY OF A THREE-YEAR MANPOWER LIMIT ON NON-US AND NON-SOVIET FORCES IN THE REDUCTION AREA OR SOME VARIANT THEREOF AS BACKING FOR EFFORTS TO BRING THE EAST TO POSTPONE TREATMENT OF WEST EUROPEAN REDUCTIONS TO A SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS. DETAILED SUGGESTIONS ARE IN VIENNA 1706.

15. DELEGATION IS CONCERNED THAT PROLONGED ALLIED STONEWALLING ON THE NUCLEAR ISSUE, ONCE SOVIETS HAVE MOVED TO ACCEPT PHASED APPROACH, WOULD SERVE
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SECRET

PAGE 04 VIENNA 02003 02 OF 02 062253Z

TO INCREASE EASTERN PRESSURES BOTH FOR INCLUSION OF EUROPEAN CONVENTIONAL FORCES AND FOR WESTERN CONCESSIONS AS REGARDS THE CONTENT OF THE US CONVENTIONAL FORCE PACKAGE. THIS WOULD BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE WITH RESPECT TO THE OBJECTIVE OF USING MBFR TO IMPROVE THE CONVENTIONAL FORCE RELATIONSHIP IN EUROPE AT THE COST OF SOME WITHDRAWAL OF US NUCLEAR WEAPONS. WE BELIEVE THE TRILATERAL TALKS IN WASHINGTON SHOULD BE USED TO BRING THE FRG AND THE UK TO THIS VIEW.HUMES

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